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Introduction 
 
In May 2005, a small group of online activists called the Electronic 
Disturbance Theater staged a virtual sit-in. Their target was the website of the 
Minutemen Project, a vigilante organization which opposes immigration to 
the US, particularly from Mexico and Latin America. From 27 to 29 May, a 
claimed 78,500 people joined an online swarm that aimed to disrupt access to 
the Minutemen’s website as a symbolic gesture of opposition, analogous to a 
physical sit-in at the organization’s premises (Dominguez 2005, Kartenberg 
2005, Jordan 2007). Such actions illustrate the practice of ‘electronic civil 
disobedience’ (ECD). The practice of ECD has been established since the mid-
1990s and certain key characteristics have emerged — actions are publicised 
in advance in order to draw as many participants as possible; actions do not 
cause damage to the targeted site, but merely simulate a sit-in; actors are open 
about their goals and identities.  
 
ECD is a key example of the Net’s capacity to enable users to exercise what 
Castells terms ‘counter-power’ — ‘the capacity by social actors to challenge 
and eventually change the power relations institutionalized in society’ (2007: 
248). However, the discourse of ECD is contested, and where its proponents 
seek to align it with the civil disobedience tradition of Thoreau, Gandhi and 
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Martin Luther King, it is frequently implicated in other discourses: in the 
concept of ‘hacktivism’ (e.g. Jordan 2002, 2007; Vegh 2003; Jordan & Taylor 
2004); in the concept of ‘netwar’ (e.g. Arquilla & Ronfeldt 1997, 2001a, 2001b, 
2001c; Arquilla 1998; Arquilla et al 1998); and in debates about terrorism (e.g. 
Denning 2000, 2001a, 2001b; Manion & Goodrum 2000; Margolis & Resnick 
2000; Hoffman 2006).  
 
In an information society, suggests Melucci, ‘the power of information is 
essentially the power of naming’ (Melucci 1996: 228, emphasis in original). The 
contested term ‘electronic civil disobedience’ and its imbrication with other 
discourses of hacking and hacktivism, of netwar and terrorism, is, in 
Melucci’s terms, ‘a conflict of nomination, conflict over the meaning of words 
and things in a society in which the name to an increasing degree supplants 
reality […] in today’s information society, the manner in which we nominate 
things at once decides their very existence’ (Melucci 1996: 161, emphasis in 
original). This chapter suggests that ECD can be better understood and 
distinguished from competing discourses by viewing it in terms of symbolic 
power (Bourdieu 1991, Thompson 1995, Couldry 2000, 2003). The chapter first 
expands upon the concept of symbolic power, before sketching the history of 
ECD. It then discusses, in turn, the distinctions between ECD and hacktivism, 
netwar and terrorism. 
 
Symbolic Power 
 
The mediascape is, as Castells argues, ‘the social space where power is 
decided’ (2007: 238). The media enable an arena for the defining of reality. 
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James Carey once argued that reality is ‘a scarce resource’ (1989: 87). In this, 
the ability to define reality is also, as Carey puts it, a ‘fundamental form of 
power’ (p. 87). This ‘fundamental form of power’ is what Bourdieu calls 
‘symbolic power’ — ‘Symbolic power is a power of constructing reality’ (1991: 
166). This is the ability 'to intervene in the course of events, to influence the 
actions of others and indeed to create events, by means of the production and 
transmission of symbolic forms’ (Thompson 1995: 17). Thompson 
distinguishes symbolic power from other dimensions of power — the 
coercive power of the military or the law, the political power of governments, 
and the economic power of corporations. Coercive power works through the 
use or threat of force; political power through the coordination and regulation 
of individuals and groups; economic power through productive activity, the 
creation of raw material, services and goods, and financial capital (1995: 12-
18). 
 
Symbolic power grows out of ‘the activity of producing, transmitting and 
receiving meaningful symbolic forms’ (Thompson 1995: 16). Such symbolic 
forms would include ideas and images, stories and songs, information and 
entertainment. They would also, of course, include activist communications, 
media interventions, and online campaigning. Symbolic power, as Bourdieu 
put it in defining the concept that Thompson develops, is the power of 
'making people see and believe' (1991: 170). It is the power to name, to define, 
to endorse, to persuade. Institutions such as the media, universities, schools, 
government and religious organizations are all in the symbolic power 
business — they are, as Hartley has it, 'sites of knowledge-production and 
meaning-exchange' (1999: 6). New media activism such as a virtual sit-in 
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campaign involves the exercise of symbolic power — the creation and 
distribution of symbolic content; the exchange of shaped information; the 
expression of cultural skills and values; advocacy, rhetoric, appeal and 
persuasion.  
 
Symbolic power is not separate from other forms of power, but bound up 
with them — political power generates resources of symbolic power; 
economic power can be expressed as symbolic power; coercive power can be 
demonstrated through the exercise of symbolic power. Not everyone is able to 
exercise this power in the same kinds of way or with the same kinds of 
success. Certain types of institution, and certain individuals, have greater 
resources than others — schools and universities; churches, temples and 
mosques; and media organizations. These are the main centres of symbolic 
power — and each, as Hartley argues (1998, 1999), is built around teaching,  a 
positive activity. ECD is one set of practices in which media, politics and 
pedagogy can be seen to converge. 
 
But all kinds of teaching are messy — and the difference between what gets 
taught and what gets learned can be a big one. The exercise of symbolic 
power is not a simple, one-way transaction — like all forms of power, it is 
expressed within relationships, and so is not entirely predictable; it is, as 
Foucault has it, ‘exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of 
nonegalitarian and mobile relations’ (1978: 94). Communicative acts can be 
interpreted in different ways. In the contemporary mediascape, 
communication is a dynamic process — even, in some accounts, a chaotic one 
(McNair 2006).  
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ECD is not implicated in economic power (it does not produce or exploit 
transformative capacity). It is not implicated in political power (there is no 
exercise of legal authority or legislative capacity, no coordination or 
regulation of populations). And above all it is not implicated in coercive 
power (there is no exercise of force, legitimate or otherwise). ECD is instead 
within the domain of symbolic power. What is at stake here is a persistent re-
framing of ECD as coercive, whether as hacking, netwar or terrorism. Each of 
these misrecognises the practice of ECD and so works to delegitimize its 
practitioners. 
 
Electronic Civil Disobedience 
 
Electronic civil disobedience was first proposed  in 1994 by Critical Art 
Ensemble (CAE) a small group of digital theorists and artists 
(http://www.critical-art.net). In their definition, electronic civil disobedience 
was 'hacking that is done primarily as a form of political resistance rather 
than as an idiosyncratic activity or as a profit- or prestige-generating process' 
(CAE interviewed in Little 1999: 194). The group's involvement with the AIDS 
activism of ACT UP in the 1980s had suggested to them that the established 
repertoire of protest gestures had lost their efficacy. Their response was to call 
for new alliances between hackers and activists, and for hacker actions 
against the cyberspace presence of institutions (CAE 1994, 1995).  
 
In naming this proposed practice, CAE aligned the concept of electronic civil 
disobedience with the widely-understood principles of traditional civil 
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disobedience, in a conscious attempt to draw legitimacy from the legacy of 
such figures as Thoreau (2000), Gandhi (2000) and Martin Luther King (2000). 
There were certain continuities with the established traditions of civil 
disobedience, such as the use of trespass and blockades as central tactics. 
However, there were also certain discontinuities, such as the de-emphasising 
of mass participation in favour of decentralised, cell-based organization, 
using small groups of from four to ten activists, and in particular the 
argument that electronic civil disobedience should be surreptitious, in the 
hacker tradition. Where practitioners of civil disobedience have been 
transparent about their opposition to the laws they break (Gandhi 2000: 410), 
CAE argued for a clandestine approach, proposing electronic civil 
disobedience as 'an underground activity that should be kept out of the 
public/popular sphere (as in the hacker tradition) and the eye of the media' 
(CAE 2001: 14).  
 
The concept of electronic civil disobedience was developed further by the 
Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT) 
<http://www.thing.net/~rdom/ecd/ecd.html>, a four-person group 
founded by one-time CAE member Ricardo Dominguez. (There was friction 
between CAE and Dominguez, which seemed to centre around ownership of 
the concept of electronic civil disobedience and its history. See, for example, 
CAE 1998). The EDT moved away from CAE's emphasis on the clandestine 
exercise of elite hacker skills towards a more transparent public spectacle 
which aimed to draw as many participants together as possible (Wray 1998, 
Electrohippies Collective 2000). Denning (2001b: 72) suggests the first action 
of this kind was undertaken in protest at the French government’s nuclear test 
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policies in December 1995 by a group called the Strano Network. In this kind 
of prototype virtual sit-in, the ‘flooding’ effect was to be obtained simply by 
mobilising large numbers of people to visit the target site simultaneously and 
repeatedly reload/refresh the page (see also Jordan 2002: 123). 
 
The EDT developed a piece of software called FloodNet, which both 
simplifies and automates such actions, which the EDT now labelled virtual 
sit-ins. Where CAE envisaged a small number of hackers with elite computer 
expertise, the EDT created a situation in which the more participants the 
better, and in which being able to click on a hyperlink was sufficient technical 
ability. The virtual sit-in enacts a simulation of a real-life physical gathering. 
As the Electrohippies, who organised a virtual sit-in as part of the Seattle 
WTO demonstrations in November 1999, put it, such actions: ‘require the 
efforts of real people, taking part in their thousands simultaneously, to make 
the action effective. If there are not enough people supporting then the action 
doesn’t work’ (Electrohippies Collective 2000: unpaginated). Any legitimacy 
the action might have derives from the number of people it gathers. These 
actions, as Dominguez puts it, are about 'creating the unbearable weight of 
human beings in a digital way' (interviewed in Meikle 2002: 142).  
 
The EDT initially developed the tactic to use in support of the Mexican 
Zapatistas, although FloodNet has been used in actions for a large number of 
other causes. In 2001, the Electrohippies staged an online action to coincide 
with the WTO meeting in Qatar (Jordan & Taylor 2004: 41). On 20 June of the 
same year, activists targeted Lufthansa's Annual General Meeting, to protest 
about the airline's involvement in the forcible deportation of asylum seekers. 
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As well as physical protests at the meeting itself, a virtual sit-in of the 
Lufthansa website was organised. While demonstrators in Cologne crowded 
the meeting venue, others around the world crowded the company's website 
in a what one observer terms: 'a hybrid of immaterial sabotage and digital 
demonstration' (Schneider 2002: 178). Other uses of the virtual sit-in tactic 
have targeted the US Republican National Committee, Dow Chemical, the 
Michigan State Legislature, and the infamous website of the Westboro Baptist 
Church of Topeka, Kansas at <http://www.godhatesfags.com>. 
 
The highest-profile use of the tactic to date was one in which the EDT were 
also key participants: the 1999 Toywar, in which an online toy retailer with 
the domain name <etoys.com>, registered in 1997, disputed the right of the 
pre-existing European art group etoy to use their own domain name 
<etoy.com>, registered in 1995. Legal action by the retailer was met with a 
sophisticated suite of tactical media responses, including a virtual sit-in of the 
toy store's website. The retailer capitulated in January 2000, two months 
before filing for bankruptcy (agent.NASDAQ 2001, Meikle 2002, Wishart & 
Bochsler 2002, Wark 2003, Jordan & Taylor 2004). 
 
The central discourse here is that of tactical media (Bey 1991; Garcia & Lovink 
1997, 1999; CAE 2001; Lovink 2002; Boler 2008). While this, as one of its main 
proponents notes, is 'a deliberately slippery term' (Lovink 2002: 271), it 
emphasises the technological, the transitory and the collaborative. Tactical 
media mix subversive creativity and creative subversion. Tactical media 
projects are characterised by mobility and flexibility, by novelty and 
reinvention, and by a certain transient and temporary dimension — ‘hit and 
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run, draw and withdraw, code and delete’, as Lovink and Schneider put it 
(2001: unpaginated).  
 
While the virtual sit-in and the wider discourse of tactical media both 
emphasise novelty and re-invention, it is important to note that there are 
continuities here as well as transformations. On the one hand, the sit-in is a 
tactic with a long history. Sharp traces its uses as far back as 1838, and 
emphasises its association with the US Civil Rights movement and, before 
that, with Abolitionist campaigns (Sharp1973: 371-4); Ackerman and Du Vall 
document a successful use of the tactic against the Nazis in 1943 (2000: 237). 
Such history can offer pedagogical possibilities for Internet activists 
introducing virtual versions of familiar tactics. Yet at the same time, the 
virtual sit-in is significant in that it takes cyberspace as the actual site of 
action. In this sense, the virtual sit-in also represents a move towards using 
the technical properties of new media to formulate new tactics for effecting 
social change. 
 
Such actions can be seen as vehicles for capturing the attention of the 
established news media, in order to force a cause onto the news agenda: 
activists can exploit the appetite for sensationalism (Vegh 2003: 92). However, 
there is a dilemma here for activists, in that while the news media are drawn 
to novelty and disruption, their coverage is also more likely to focus on that 
very novelty and disruption than on the underlying issues or causes involved, 
which may in fact work against the activist cause (Scalmer 2002: 41). This 
dilemma is especially pertinent in relation to the example of the virtual sit-in 
and its discourse of electronic civil disobedience. 
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Electronic Civil Disobedience and Hacktivism 
 
The practices of ECD are frequently subsumed under the discourse of 
‘hacktivism’ (Denning 2001a, Jordan 2002, Vegh 2003, Jordan & Taylor 2004, 
Gunkel 2005, Taylor 2005). For Denning: ‘Hacktivism is the convergence of 
hacking with activism […] Hacktivism includes electronic civil disobedience’ 
(2001a: 263). ‘Hacktivism’, suggest Jordan and Taylor, ‘is activism gone 
electronic’ (2004: 1); it is ‘a combination of grassroots political protest with 
computer hacking’ and ‘the emergence of popular political action […] in 
cyberspace’ (2004: 1). 
 
In part, the discourse of hacktivism is an attempt to link ECD to the original 
discourse of the ‘hacker ethic’ (Levy 1984: 26-36). Taylor (2005) suggests that 
hacking had become the pursuit of technological mastery as an end in itself, 
whereas hacktivism introduced a new kind of political objective. If the EDT 
are hackers at all, it is in Levy’s sense, which he applied to the innovators and 
designers of the early computer industry. Hacking, in Levy’s description, 
was: ‘a philosophy of sharing, openness, decentralization, and getting your 
hands on machines at any cost — to improve the machines, and to improve 
the world’ (Levy 1984: ix). A ‘hack’ was an elegant solution to a technological 
problem; more than that, it had to be, as Levy says, ‘imbued with innovation, 
style, and technical virtuosity’ (1984: 10). In Levy’s usage, hacking was about 
improving systems rather than crashing them; about sharing information 
rather than stealing or changing it. The early hackers made computer 
breakthroughs, not break-ins. ‘The hacker’, as Turkle put it, ‘is a person 
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outside the system who is never excluded by its rules’ (1984: 208). The early 
hacker ethic, in Paul Taylor’s analysis, had at its core three features: ‘the 
ingenious use of any technology; the tendency to reverse engineer technology 
to do the opposite of its intended design; and the desire to explore systems’ 
(Taylor 2005: 628). Or as cyberpunk science fiction novelist William Gibson 
observed, ‘the street finds its own uses for things’ (1986: 215). The Hacker 
Ethic persists in the Open Source software movement, and in related 
movements inspired by it, such as the Open Publishing models of the global 
Indymedia movement, and there have also been important restatements of 
this Hacker Ethic discourse (Himanen 2001, Wark 2004).  
 
However, the discourse of ‘hacking’ has shifted radically in the more than 
two decades since Levy popularised the Hacker Ethic. Hackers have become, 
in Stanley Cohen’s, term ‘folk devils’ (1972). The roots of this shift can be 
traced to the 1990 co-ordinated arrests and show trials in the US, Operation 
Sundevil (Sterling 1992, Jordan 1999). Sterling sees the real struggle in this 
and the early hacker show trials that followed as one over control of language: 
‘The real struggle was over the control of telco language, the control of telco 
knowledge. It was a struggle to defend the social “membrane of 
differentiation” that forms the wall of the telco community’s ivory tower’ 
(1992: 274). A struggle, in other words, over inclusion and exclusion, and over 
naming and control; a struggle expressed through and for symbolic power. 
 
In this context, it becomes important to ask whether FloodNet is in fact 
hacking in any meaningful sense. EDT member Carmin Karasic points out 
that: ‘FloodNet never accessed or destroyed any data, nor tampered with 
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security, nor changed websites, nor crashed servers’ 
<http://www.pixelyze.com/scrapbook/index.htm>. If FloodNet does not 
make sense as hacking, therefore, is there anything at stake for the EDT in 
their implication within the hacktivism discourse? Hacking, after all, is 
something that many people would consider frightening, unfamiliar, criminal 
behaviour — the precise opposite of the connotations that the EDT see as 
advantages of using the term electronic civil disobedience. One conclusion to 
be drawn from this argument is that promoting an emergent cyberspatial 
politics as ‘hacktivism’ means dealing with the baggage of the ‘hack’ 
component of the term. This term may make it all too easy for electronic civil 
disobedience to be marginalised and demonised in turn. One challenge for 
activists, then, is not just to formulate new strategies and tactics appropriate 
to a shifting mediascape, but to recognise the ongoing need to create a careful 
vocabulary for discussing those tactics and strategies. 
 
Electronic Civil Disobedience and Netwar 
 
On 31 October 1998, the New York Times declared on its front page that the 
Electronic Disturbance Theater had declared ‘netwar’ on the Mexican 
government. From some angles, this would appear to be a good result for the 
group in publicity terms. Vegh, for example, contends that ‘While the U.S. 
mainstream media are in the hands of the corporate world, the sensationalist 
nature of hacktivism works to the activists’ advantage’ (2003: 92). However, 
the New York Times example, with its media declaration of ‘netwar’, points to 
how the practices of ECD can be framed within military discourses. Central to 
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this is the discourse of netwar (Arquilla & Ronfeldt 1997, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c; 
Arquilla 1998; Arquilla et al 1998):  
 
Netwar refers to information-related conflict at a grand level between nations 
or societies. It means trying to disrupt, damage, or modify what a target 
population “knows” or thinks it knows about itself and the world around it. A 
netwar may focus on public or elite opinion, or both. It may involve public 
diplomacy measures, propaganda and psychological campaigns, political and 
cultural subversion, deception of or interference with local media, infiltration 
of computer networks and databases, and efforts to promote a dissident or 
opposition movements [sic] across computer networks (Arquilla & Ronfeldt 
1997: 28). 
 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s emphasis in this definition on information, opinion, 
diplomacy and propaganda identifies the concept as one within the domain 
of symbolic power relations. However, their choice of ‘war’ as the key term 
and discursive framework implies a coercive dimension which is in fact 
absent from the practice of ECD. 
 
An essential component of the netwar concept is the use of network forms of 
organization: 
 
The [information] revolution is favoring and strengthening network forms of 
organization, often giving them an advantage of hierarchical forms. The rise of 
networks means that power is migrating to nonstate actors, because they are 
able to organize into sprawling multiorganizational networks […] more readily 
than can traditional, hierarchical, state actors. This means that conflicts may 
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increasingly be waged by “networks”, perhaps more than by “hierarchies”. It 
also means that whoever masters the network form stands to gain the 
advantage (Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001a: 1). 
 
A key tactic of such netwar practice is swarming: ‘a seemingly amorphous, 
but deliberately structured, co-ordinated, strategic way to strike from all 
directions at a particular point or points’ (Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001a: 12). This 
is the principle underlying the tactic of the virtual sit-in. Swarming is a 
concept which has to some extent been popularised in Howard Rheingold’s 
analogous concept of ‘smart mobs’. Smart mobs, writes Rheingold, ‘consist of 
people who are able to act in concert even if they don’t know each other’ 
(2002: xii). The role of mobile communications in connecting and coordinating 
the crowds that forced the ouster of Philippines President Joseph Estrada in 
January 2001 is one example (Goggin 2006, Rafael 2006). Others would 
include the various so-called anti-globalisation protests in Seattle, Prague, 
Melbourne, Genoa and elsewhere (Electrohippies Collective 2000, de Armond 
2001, Meikle 2002, Jordan & Taylor 2004, Kahn & Kellner 2004), or the 
monthly ‘organized coincidence’ that is Critical Mass, with its regular 
coordinated bike rides by transport activists in cities around the world. 
 
Arquilla has described the virtual sit-in as a harbinger of more widespread 
and effective tactics, framing it explicitly in terms of military discourse: 
‘FloodNet is the info age equivalent of the first sticks of bombs dropped from 
slow-moving Zeppelins in the Great War […] The implication, of course, is 
that netwar will evolve, as air war did, growing greatly in effect over time’ 
(Arquilla interviewed in Meikle 2002: 157). A central question, however, is 
whether such events are best described using terms built around the 
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vocabulary of warfare. The RAND analysts have acknowledged, for instance, 
that what they term ‘social netwars’ may in fact have ‘some positive 
consequences, especially for spurring social and political reforms’ (Arquilla et 
al 1998: 120). Given this point, and the participation of such groups as the Red 
Cross and the Catholic church in the Zapatista support campaigns, it can be 
contended that there is something problematic about the ‘war’ component of  
the term ‘netwar’. Why not, for example, ‘netpeace’? It is important to 
emphasise that ECD was framed from the beginning by its theorists as a 
nonviolent concept. For example, ECD, wrote CAE, is ‘a nonviolent activity 
by its very nature, since the oppositional forces never physically confront one 
another’ (1995: 18). There is something problematic about this militarisation of 
humanitarian actions: specifically, the connotations of netwar tend to 
demonise non-state actors while legitimising state actors and actions. It is a 
vivid illustration of a struggle expressed over and through the exercise of 
symbolic power. 
 
Electronic Civil Disobedience and Terrorism 
 
The third discourse under which ECD is often subsumed is that of terrorism. 
For example, one survey of Internet politics includes a brief account of the 
EDT and FloodNet in a chapter on ‘criminal activity in cyberspace’, which 
concludes that cyberspace ‘needs to be safeguarded against terrorist attacks’ 
(Margolis & Resnick 2000: 202). Terrorism analyst Bruce Hoffman also 
discusses ECD in a terrorism frame, quoting a human rights activist from an 
established NGO under the sub-heading ‘Terrorist and Insurgent Use of the 
Internet’ (2006: 201), and implying a link between electronic civil 
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disobedience in support of the Zapatistas and the use of the Internet by 
terrorist groups (2006: 204). One content analysis of US newspaper articles 
about hacking suggested that the discourse about hacking was increasingly 
blurred with that of cyberterrorism, with online protest activity represented 
as disruption, vandalism or worse (Vegh 2005).  
 
In one of the most important examples of this linkage, the writings of 
computer security analyst Dorothy Denning repeatedly place activists, 
hacktivists and ‘cyberterrorists’ within the same analytical frame, suggesting 
that ‘the boundaries between them are somewhat fuzzy’ (2001a: 241) and that 
‘an individual can play all three roles’ (2001a: 242). This is a problematic 
analysis, which yokes together disparate behaviours and practices in a 
hypothetical frame (Denning’s discussion of cyberterrorism is entirely future-
oriented). Denning’s use of terms such as ‘hacker warriors’ and ‘cyber 
warriors’ blurs the line between non-violent symbolic protest, and coercive 
action. One essay (2001b) conflates activism and terrorism, writing of ‘hacker 
warriors’ who ‘often initiate the use of aggression and needlessly attack 
civilian systems’ (2001b: 70). In this discussion of cyberspace as ‘digital 
battleground’ (2001b: 75), the very real distinctions between symbolic political 
protest and coercive violence are elided. The potential consequences of all this 
for political activists are contained in a line from Denning’s own work: ‘the 
threat of cyberterrorism, combined with hacking threats in general, is influencing 
policy decisions related to cyber-defence at both a national and international 
level’ (2001a: 288, emphasis added). 
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It should be acknowledged that elsewhere Denning has emphasised the 
distinction between civil disobedience and terrorism: ‘Both EDT and the 
Electrohippies view their operations as acts of civil disobedience, analogous 
to street protests and physical sit-ins, not as acts of violence or terrorism. This 
is an important distinction. Most activists […] are not terrorists’ (2000: 
unpaginated). It is indeed an important distinction, and Ricardo Dominguez 
has quoted this more than once in support of his own organization 
(Dominguez 2005, Kartenberg 2005). But by placing activists and non-violent 
protests within the same frame as terrorism, Denning undermines the 
distinction. 
 
In September 1999, EDT member Stefan Wray made a presentation to the US 
National Security Agency. Wray pointed out that the event’s program had 
renamed his group ‘the Electronic Disruption Theater’ and described the 
Zapatistas as a ‘sect’. While these could, of course, have been the result of 
simple errors, Wray argued that they may also have represented what he 
termed ‘an attempt to recategorize who we are into a framework that is 
understandable to the national security minds’ (1999b). This is not a trivial 
issue: the ways in which actions are framed and described, the motives 
attributed, meanings sought and implied, are a fundamental symbolic power 
struggle. For example, as Schlesinger, Murdock and Elliott have argued in 
relation to definitions of terrorism: ‘Contests over definitions are not just 
word games. Real political outcomes are at stake. […] Language matters, and 
how the media use language matters’ (Schlesinger, Murdock & Elliott 1983: 1). 
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The most sobering relevant example of the dangers of allowing symbolic 
protest to be conflated with terrorism is the case of Steve Kurtz of Critical Art 
Ensemble, the group who initiated the discourse of electronic civil 
disobedience. In May 2004 Kurtz was detained by FBI agents on suspicion of 
‘bioterrorism’. Agents seized lab material used in CAE’s art works about 
genetic modification, as well as their writings, and initially sought to bring 
charges relating to biological weaponry. Although it became clear that the 
materials were harmless and readily obtainable by anyone, and moreover had 
been used in legitimate art works at public galleries, the investigation was not 
dropped and the charges were changed to allegations of ‘mail fraud’ and 
‘wire fraud’, revolving around technical details of how Kurtz obtained some 
of the material, worth $256, from his co-accused Professor Robert Ferrell. At 
the time of writing in January 2008, Kurtz and Ferrell face potential prison 
sentences of twenty years, in a precedent-setting conflation of art criticism 
and ‘terrorist’ scare-mongering <http://caedefensefund.org>. 
 
ECD can be distinguished from terrorism insofar as the practice of terrorism 
is coercive (although its discourse may also be symbolic). In the case of ECD, 
both practice and discourse are symbolic. This point is developed below in 
the final section of this essay. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In what ways is electronic civil disobedience implicated in symbolic power? 
We can distinguish between the practice of ECD and the discourse of ECD. 
The practice of ECD involves publicising and promoting actions, such as 
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virtual sit-ins. This usually involves distributing information through email 
lists and websites, although it has also involved participation in art events, 
academic conferences, and gatherings of hackers or security personnel, as 
well as giving frequent interviews to journalists, academics, other writers, 
broadcasters and film-makers. The practice of ECD involves the carrying out 
of actions which are on one level simulations and are partly rhetorical. 
FloodNet does not crash or immobilise servers: it enables a simulation of a 
physical gathering in order to draw attention to a cause. And the practice of 
ECD involves exploiting this attention — particularly the attention of the 
established media, and any subsequent discussion of the action or, more 
rarely, the cause in support of which the action was held. The discourse of 
ECD involves the invoking of high-value historical antecedents from the civil 
disobedience tradition, such as Gandhi or Thoreau. But it also involves 
problematic involvements with the discourses of hacktivism, netwar and 
terrorism, as well as a dispute over ‘ownership’ of the concept between CAE 
and EDT. In both the practice and the discourse of ECD, all of these key 
aspects revolve around claim and counter-claim, around rhetoric and 
persuasion, within the arena of symbolic power relations. If legitimate forms 
of nonviolent online protest are to continue, they should be recognised as 
manifestations not of coercive violence or force, but of symbolic power. 
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